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A Few Notes  
 
This thesis will refer throughout to the archipelago of Svalbard.  Historically, the archipelago was 
called Spitsbergen (often misspelled Spitzbergen), until a name change instituted by the Norwegian 
government in 1925.  I will use Svalbard throughout to avoid confusion. 
This thesis draws upon a variety of legal and diplomatic documents, some of which are in 
French.  All translations are my own, with the original French text listed below in a footnote. 
Primary sources from the Svalbard “Literature Lobby” were often published in obscure journals 
with a wide geographical range.  In the interest of transparency and ease of future research, I have 
included a primary source finding aid available at the following link: 
https://www.academia.edu/42902800/Svalbard_Question_Primary_Source_Finding_Aid   
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
On February 9, 1920, the Svalbard Treaty was signed by representatives of the United States of 
America, Great Britain, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, Netherland, and Sweden in the French 
Foreign Ministry in Paris, assigning sovereignty of the Arctic archipelago to Norway and thereby 
instituting a solution to a problem that had troubled northern European diplomacy for decades.1  The 
attempts of earlier conferences in 1910, 1912, and 1914 to resolve the Svalbard Question had ended in 
failure.  The Svalbard Commission, a sub-committee of the Paris Peace Conference, was, in contrast, a 
remarkable success.2  As has been elucidated by substantial scholarly exertion, the realization of a 
solution to the Svalbard Question was due to a number of factors, including passionate lobbying by the 
Norwegian Minister, Baron Wedel-Jarlsberg, declining American mining activity in Svalbard, British focus 
on attaining the German mandates, and the exclusion of Germany and the Soviet Union from the 
negotiations.3  Although the explanation of the causes of the resolution of the Svalbard Question is 
essential to understanding the dynamics surrounding the Svalbard negotiations, focus on the topic has 
led to a lack of scholarly appreciation for the importance of the relationship to and understanding of 
international law by those involved in the Svalbard negotiations.  Furthermore, previous scholarship has 
emphasized the Svalbard Commission’s solution of Norwegian sovereignty, while largely ignoring the 
many intriguing suggestions at the time for divided or limited sovereignty in the archipelago.  Intimately 
linked to these legal roads-not-taken is terra nullius, a Latin legal term that means “no man’s land.”  
 
                                                          
1 Trygve Mathisen, Svalbard in International Politics 1871-1925 (Oslo, Norsk Polarinstitutt, 1954): 149. And 
Norwegian Royal Ministry of Justice, Treaty of 9 February 1920 relating to Spitsbergen (Svalbard) (1988), Accessible 
at app.uio.no/ub/ujur/oversatte-lover/data/lov-19250717-011-eng.pdf 
2 Mathisen, Svalbard, 128, 132. 
3 Elen Singh, The Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Question: United States foreign policy, 1907-1935 (Oslo, Universitetsforl, 
1980): 21, 106. Frigga Kruse, “Spitsbergen – Imperialists beyond the British Empire,” In LASHIPA: History of Large 
Scale Resource Exploitation in Polar Areas, edited by Louwrens Hacquebord (Groningen, Barkhuis, 2012): 69-70. 
Mathisen, Svalbard, 133-134. Luke Campopiano, “Non-State Actors in the Arctic: Lessons from the 1920 Svalbard 
Treaty Negotiations,” St Andrews Historical Journal 8, no. 1 (2019): 48. 
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This thesis will explore the anomalous usage of terra nullius in the context of debates over the 
sovereignty of Svalbard from 1907 to 1920.  Before delving into the world of the Svalbard Question and 
international law, it will be helpful to briefly sketch the recent history of terra nullius and explain some 
common misconceptions about its origin and meaning.   
In November 1992, the High Court of Australia issued a landmark ruling in the native title case of 
Mabo and Others v. Queensland (No. 2).  The case is commonly represented as having “destroyed the 
legal doctrine of terra nullius by which Australia was colonized,” as it was phrased in a retrospective 
article from 2002.4  Terra nullius is thus presented as a now defunct colonial-era legal doctrine based 
upon racist suppositions that societies outside of Europe are barbaric and lacking in rights to property or 
sovereignty.  The historical role of terra nullius is, in fact, far more complicated.  Further scholarly work 
has led to the conclusion that the term terra nullius was not used in the context of colonization and 
dispossession of the Australian Aboriginals.  Indeed, terra nullius did not even appear as a term until the 
1880s.5  As the Australian historian, Andrew Fitzmaurice, put it, “Terra nullius, it seems, was an 
impostor.”6 
Why then was the repudiation of terra nullius by the Australian legal system so celebrated?  The 
Australian legal scholar David Ritter suggests that the mistreatment of Australian Aboriginals sits 
uneasily with the liberal pretensions of the Australian common law, especially given its historical 
inaction in protecting Aboriginal land rights.  Mabo thus created terra nullius as “a stage edifice that was 
                                                          
4 “10 years after Mabo, Eddie's spirit dances on,” The Sydney Morning Herald (2002), Accessible at 
https://www.smh.com.au/national/10-years-after-mabo-eddies-spirit-dances-on-20020531-gdfbqm.html 
5 Andrew Fitzmaurice, “The genealogy of Terra Nullius,” Australian Historical Studies 38, no. 129 (2007): 2.  
Fitzmaurice writes that the earliest use of terra nullius that he had found was in a work from 1885.  I found a 
slightly earlier mention of terra nullius in the October 21, 1884 edition of the Daily Telegraph & Courier in the 
context of the Berlin Conference.  
6 Fitzmaurice, “Genealogy,” 1. 
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demolished so that the good name of the Australian legal system could be redeemed.”7  Fitzmaurice 
finds this theory of terra nullius as newly created myth to be less than satisfying.  He instead argues that 
terra nullius is a descendent of the “legal tradition that dominated questions of the justice of 
‘occupation’ at the time that Australia was colonized.  Terra nullius is a product of the history of 
dispossession and the larger history of European expansion.”8  He traces the evolution of the use of 
terra nullius by scholars in the Mabo sense of a broad justificatory doctrine “of the expansionism of the 
previous centuries of colonization” to the Columbia Joint Seminar in International Law taught by Charles 
Cheney Hyde and Philip C. Jessup in the 1930s.9  Students from the Seminar went on to publish a 
number of works, including “The acquisition to legal title in terra nullius” and Creation of rights of 
sovereignty through symbolic acts 1400–1800, that utilized terra nullius as an overarching term for 
centuries of evolving doctrines of colonization.10  Laura Benton, an American legal historian, similarly 
suggests that in recent scholarly usage “the term terra nullius may be standing in for not a single 
doctrine but a legal orientation and a diverse set of practices.”11 
Clearly, for many scholars, terra nullius is a useful shorthand for a variety of historical 
phenomena.  Debate over the utility or misleading nature of this convention is likely to continue.  This 
thesis will not be concerned with precursors of terra nullius in seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth 
century colonial doctrines nor with its contemporary usage in reference to cases such as Mabo.  Instead, 
I will focus on the definition of terra nullius as understood in contemporary international law.  The most 
authoritative statement of the meaning of terra nullius comes from the International Court of Justice’s 
                                                          
7 David Ritter, “The ‘rejection of terra nullius’ in Mabo: a critical analysis” The Sydney Law Review 18, no. 1 (1996): 
7. 
8 Fitzmaurice, “Genealogy,” 2. 
9 Andrew Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, Property and Empire 1500-2000 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2014): 319-320. 
10 James Simsarian, “The acquisition to legal title in terra nullius,” Political Science Quarterly 53, no. 1 
(1938): 111–28. Arthur Keller, Oliver Lissitzyn, and Frederick Mann, Creation of rights of sovereignty through 
symbolic acts 1400–1800 (Columbia University Press, Columbia, 1938). Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, 320-321. 
11 Lauren Benton & Benjamin Straumann, “Acquiring Empire by Law: From Roman Doctrine to Early Modern 
European Practice,” Law and History Review, 28, no. 1 (2010): 11. 
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Western Sahara Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975.  The Court described terra nullius as territory that 
is “open to acquisition through the legal process of ‘occupation,’” where occupation means “peaceably 
acquiring sovereignty over territory” that is not previously under sovereign rule.12  The Court further 
stressed that “territories inhabited by tribes or peoples having a social and political organization were 
not regarded as terrae nullius.”13  Put more simply, terra nullius is a no man’s land that is open to claims 
by the first comer.  
So much for the contemporary meaning of terra nullius in international law.  The impetus for 
this thesis originates in American legal scholar Christopher R. Rossi’s article, “‘A Unique International 
Problem’: The Svalbard Treaty, Equal Enjoyment, and Terra Nullius: Lessons of Territorial Temptation 
from History.”  In that work, Rossi argues that contemporary debates over Svalbard’s sovereignty result 
from the “peculiar equivocations” in the Svalbard Treaty, which are themselves derived from “Svalbard’s 
constructed terra nullius status.”14  The eccentricity of the 1920 Svalbard Treaty lies in its blending of 
“the full and absolute sovereignty of Norway” with “equal liberty of access” and equal rights to fishing, 
hunting, and mineral extraction for nationals of all other countries that are parties to the Treaty.15  The 
Norwegian legal scholar, Geir Ulfstein, characterizes the Svalbard Treaty as accomplishing three main 
goals: “granting sovereignty to Norway,” preserving “the previous terra nullius status through non-
discrimination [against non-Norwegian nationals],” and securing “peaceful utilization” of the 
                                                          
12 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, 39. 
13 Western Sahara, 39. 
14 Christopher R. Rossi, “‘A Unique International Problem’: The Svalbard Treaty, Equal Enjoyment, and Terra 
Nullius: Lessons of Territorial Temptation from History,” Washington University Global Studies Law Review 15, no. 
1 (2016): 98. This unique privileging of foreign nationals’ access to Svalbard has resulted in a relatively 
international community, as is emphasized by the existence of the primarily Russian and Ukrainian town of 
Barentsburg and the presence of citizens from over 40 countries in the main town of Longyearbyen. See Adam 
Grydehøj, Anne Grydehøj, and Maria Ackrén, “The Globalization of the Arctic: Negotiating Sovereignty and Building 
Communities in Svalbard, Norway,” Island Studies Journal 7, no. 1 (2012): 107-108. 
15 Norwegian Royal Ministry of Justice, Treaty, Accessible at app.uio.no/ub/ujur/oversatte-lover/data/lov-
19250717-011-eng.pdf 
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archipelago.16  Thus, the unusual nature of Svalbard’s contemporary legal status and the 1920 Treaty 
that established it originate in the historical and legal conditions prevailing in the archipelago before 
1920. 
Svalbard’s history will explored in detail in the next chapter, but, for now, it will suffice to sketch 
some of the general developments.  Svalbard, an Arctic archipelago located halfway between Norway 
and the North Pole, was discovered in 1596 and soon became a site for extensive whaling and sealing 
activity.  The collapse of animal populations from overexploitation reduced economic opportunities in 
the archipelago by the end of the seventeenth century and caused Svalbard to recede from the interests 
of nearby nations.  Svalbard only returned to European consciousness in a significant way by the end of 
the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century as coal mining expanded on the 
archipelago.  The increase in population and economic activity spawned conflict and four international 
conferences were held during the 1910s with the intention of introducing governance to Svalbard.17   
Despite the nearly universal sentiment that Svalbard’s anarchic state was unsatisfactory, 
diplomats insisted on the maintenance of the archipelago’s status as terra nullius.18  Herein lies one part 
of the anomalous nature of the legal description of Svalbard as terra nullius.  As mentioned above, 
according to the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, terra nullius in contemporary international law 
refers to unowned territory that is available for annexation by any nation.   Svalbard before 1920 “was 
ownerless property in the unusual sense that states were maneuvering to preclude any state’s sole title 
to this territory that nevertheless had become enmeshed in conflicting multinational private property 
                                                          
16 Geir Ulfstein, The Svalbard Treaty: From Terra Nullius to Norwegian Sovereignty (Oslo, Scandinavian University 
Press, 1995): 49. 
17 For a detailed selection of sources on Svalbard’s history, see the next chapter.  The main works for the pre-
Treaty era are Trygve Mathisen, Svalbard in International Politics 1871-1925 (Oslo, Norsk Polarinstitutt, 1954) and 
Elen Singh, The Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Question: United States foreign policy, 1907-1935 (Oslo, Universitetsforl, 
1980).  Good sources for after 1925 are Trygve Mathisen, Svalbard in the Changing Arctic (Oslo, Norsk 
Polarinstitutt, 1954) and Thor Arlov, A short history of Svalbard (Oslo, Norwegian Polar Institute, 1994). 
18 In this paper, I’ll be using diplomats as a shorthand for all government officials engaged in foreign policy activity 
related to Svalbard. 
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disputes,” all while there were suggestions of “various schemes for the international administration of 
the archipelago.”19  Substantial governance of a territory seems to rule out the possibility of a total 
absence of sovereignty there.  Rossi is hardly the first scholar to contrast Svalbard’s terra nullius 
appellation with its preclusion from annexation and proposed international regulation.  Indeed, as early 
as 1908, a French legal scholar, René Waultrin, argued that “it should be noted that there is something 
strange and contradictory about proclaiming that a territory lacks sovereignty and [then] giving it 
laws.”20   
The second anomalous component of Svalbard’s terra nullius status dates back to 1872, when 
Russia and Sweden-Norway agreed that Svalbard would remain “an undecided domain accessible to all 
states whose nationals seek to exploit its natural resources” and would be excluded from annexation.21  
If terra nullius is, by definition, capable of annexation by the first state to claim sovereignty, how could 
Svalbard be declared terra nullius and yet incapable of annexation?   
Rossi, drawing upon Geir Ulfstein’s analysis, suggests that Svalbard before 1920 more closely 
resembled a res communis (everyone’s thing) than a terra nullius (no one’s land).22  Res communis refers 
to parts of the world that are held in common by all of humanity, such as outer space and the high 
seas.23  To make the differences between terra nullius and res communis more apparent, I will introduce 
the terms acquisitive nullification and distributive nullification.  Acquisitive nullification is a process 
                                                          
19 Rossi, “Unique Problem,” 111, 122. 
20 « il faut remarquer qu’il y a quelque chose étrange et contradictoire à proclamer un territoire sans maitre et à lui 
donner des lois » René Waultrin, “La question de la souveraineté des terres arctiques,” Revue générale de droit 
international public 15 (1908): 105.  René Waultrin was a pseudonym for René Dollot.  See Rip Bulkeley, “Polar 
Internationalism, Diplomacy, and The International Geophysical Year,” In National and Trans-National Agendas in 
Antarctic Research from the 1950s and Beyond. Proceedings of the 3rd Workshop of the SCAR Action Group on the 
History of Antarctic Research, edited by Cornelia Lüdecke, Lynn Tipton-Everett, and Lynn Lay (Columbus, The Ohio 
State University, 2012): 25.  I will refer to him throughout as Waultrin. 
21 «un domaine indécis accessible à tous les Etats dont les nationaux cherchent à en exploiter les ressources 
naturelles.» Ministerstvo inostrannykh dıe͡l, Diplomaticheskaıa͡ perepiska. Shpits͡bergen 1871-1912 (St. Petersburg, 
Tip. V.Ḟ. Kirshbauma, 1912): 3. 
22 Rossi, “Unique Problem,” 117. 
23 Ulfstein, Treaty, 37. 
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wherein legal entities are created that are owned by no one sovereign and capable of such ownership by 
the first comer.  Distributive nullification creates legal entities that are owned by no one sovereign and 
permanently excluded from the possibility of such ownership.  Using this new terminology, the legal 
anomaly of Svalbard according to Rossi and others is that it was labeled with an acquisitive nullification 
term, terra nullius, while it was actually a legal regime characterized by distributive nullification.  While 
this new terminology is illuminating, it fails to capture the ambiguity in the usage of terra nullius in 
practice.  In the context of debates over Svalbard’s legal status, terra nullius was used to mean 
acquisitive nullification, distributive nullification, and confused statuses in between.  This multiplicity of 
meanings is described in the following evocative passage from Rossi’s article: 
But what did terra nullius mean in Spitsbergen’s twentieth century context?  Did it preclude 
possession by states as a confused or commingled expression of res communis? Did it imply a 
condominium arrangement among interested parties?  Did it require formal multilateral legal 
administration through treaty creation?  Or did it express a beachcomber’s delight, bestowing 
treasures on privateers who were lucky or capable enough to fall first into possession of ownerless 
property?  Each of these usages attached to the meaning of terra nullius in Spitsbergen’s 
history…24 
Thus, the scholar who intends to make sense of the usage of terra nullius in the context of the Svalbard 
Question must exercise caution in attributing any one meaning to the term.  To clarify the different uses 
of terra nullius, this thesis will establish a detailed taxonomy of the relevant historical actors, describe 
their relations to each other, and explain their varied understandings of terra nullius and international 
law.  I will also explore previous attempts to explain the anomalous usage of terra nullius in secondary 
literature before turning to a thorough analysis of the primary sources of the period.  I will conclude that 
terra nullius was used differently in the Svalbard context depending on the actor and his or her knowledge 
                                                          
24 Rossi, “Unique Problem,” 120. 
12 
 
of international law.  When informal diplomatic agreements were translated into specific legal terms, such 
as terra nullius, Svalbard’s anomalous status became clear.  Several legal scholars understood this and 
argued that referring to Svalbard as terra nullius was paradoxical and likely incoherent.  Diplomats and 
others read the legal scholars and began using the term terra nullius to refer to Svalbard, but did not 
understand or realize the importance of the legal debate, being far more focused on the practical 
problems of asserting historical claims and balancing national interests. 
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Chapter II: Historical and Legal Background 
 
An analysis of the use of terra nullius in the context of the Svalbard negotiations requires an 
understanding of the relevant historical actors and their differing levels of knowledge of international 
law.  While legal scholars might seem to be the only reasonable target for analysis of the use of terra 
nullius, it is essential to view each group as part of the broader context of the Svalbard negotiations.  
Legal scholars had the most sophisticated understanding of terra nullius and Svalbard’s status, but they 
relied on explorers and scientists for practical information about Svalbard and its development.  
Additionally, the knowledge of legal scholars was filtered through diplomats and government officials 
who engaged directly in the negotiation process.  To properly illustrate the complex interaction of the 
actors involved in the resolution of the Svalbard Question, this chapter will begin with a historical 
background of Svalbard and the development of relevant concepts in international law.   
 
Historical Background 
 
Svalbard is an archipelago located about midway between Norway and the North Pole.25   The 
entire archipelago was known as Spitsbergen until 1925.  Today, only the largest island is called 
Spitsbergen.  This paper will use the term, Svalbard, even when speaking of historical negotiations that 
occurred before the name change.26  In 1596, the Dutch explorer Willem Barentsz discovered Svalbard.27  
Svalbard had no indigenous population, but soon would be periodically inhabited by settlers from 
                                                          
25 Ulfstein, Treaty, 17. 
26 For a description of the motivation behind the name change, see Roald Berg, “From ‘Spitsbergen’ to ‘Svalbard’. 
Norwegianization in Norway and in the ‘Norwegian Sea’, 1820–1925,” Acta Borealia 30, no. 2 (2013): 154-173. 
For a quantitative analysis of the effects of the name change, see Robert Vaagan, “Online Newspaper Repositories 
and Norwegian-Russian media frames of Svalbard,” First Monday 18, no. 7 (2013). 
27 There is insufficient evidence to confirm or deny proposed earlier discoveries of Svalbard by Norsemen or 
Russian Pomors. See Mathisen, Svalbard, 7-8. 
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northern European countries, especially Norwegians and Russians.28  The first half of the seventeenth 
century witnessed fierce whaling competition and territorial disputes between the English, Dutch, and 
Danish-Norwegians.  Svalbard’s international importance greatly decreased after a significant decline in 
its whale stocks.  By the eighteenth century, Svalbard’s geopolitical and economic status was relatively 
insignificant and, by the nineteenth century, the archipelago was generally considered to be without 
territorial claimants.29  At this time, Swedish scientists and Norwegian hunters were a common seasonal 
presence in Svalbard.30   
In 1871, at the urging of the explorer and scientist Adolf Erik Nordenskiöld, the Swedish-
Norwegian government considered the possibility of establishing a colony on Svalbard.  Such a project 
might have required the annexation of Svalbard by Sweden-Norway.  Given the geopolitical significance 
of such an act, Sweden-Norway decided to obtain the opinions of other European powers about the 
potential annexation of Svalbard.31  The Danish, Dutch, French, German, and British governments 
favored Sweden-Norway’s annexation of Svalbard, provided that their fishing rights were protected.  In 
Russia, however, businesses with interests in the Arctic claimed that long-standing historical presence 
on Svalbard entitled Russians to rights to the archipelago.32  The Russian government therefore 
responded to Sweden-Norway with an argument for the maintenance of Svalbard as “an undecided 
domain accessible to all states whose nationals seek to exploit its natural resources.”33  The precise legal 
significance of this diplomatic exchange is disputed by scholars, but, practically speaking, Russia and 
                                                          
28 Ulfstein, Treaty, 26. And Dag Avango, Louwrens Hacquebord, Ypie Aalders, Hidde De Haas, Ulf Gustafsson, and 
Frigga Kruse, “Between markets and geo-politics: natural resource exploitation on Spitsbergen from 1600 to the 
present day,” Polar Record 47, no. 1 (2011): 32-33. 
29 Mathisen, Svalbard, 9-17. 
30 Mathisen, Svalbard, 20. 
31 Mathisen, Svalbard, 21-24.  See also Ministerstvo, Shpits͡bergen, 1-2. 
32 Mathisen, Svalbard, 24-25. 
33 «un domaine indécis accessible à tous les Etats dont les nationaux cherchent à en exploiter les ressources 
naturelles.» Ministerstvo, Shpits͡bergen, 3. 
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Sweden-Norway emerged as guarantors of an international Svalbard open to economic exploitation, but 
not subject to annexation by any nation.34   
This informal diplomatic arrangement would prove remarkably influential on Svalbard’s later 
political and legal development.  Indeed, despite certain schemes for Swedish-Norwegian annexation or 
joint sovereignty held by Russia and Sweden-Norway, Svalbard entered the twentieth century under the 
same regime that dated to 1871.35  Economic activity on the archipelago had increased remarkably, 
however, with the introduction of coal mining in Svalbard.36  A Norwegian company shipped the first 
coal from Svalbard in 1899 and American and British companies arrived soon after.37  The most 
important of these companies were the Scottish Spitsbergen Syndicate, founded by William Speirs 
Bruce, and the Arctic Coal Company, founded by the Americans Frederick Ayer and John Munro 
Longyear.38  With the increase in industry on Svalbard and the lack of laws or governmental regulation, 
concerns grew over claim jumping and labor strikes.39  Other observers worried about the impacts on 
Svalbard’s wildlife of unrestricted hunting by both professionals and tourists.40 
Svalbard’s growth in economic activity and subsequent conflict occurred at roughly the same 
time as the dissolution of Sweden-Norway in 1905.  The newly independent Norwegian government, no 
longer constrained by Swedish dominance of its foreign policy, took an active role in seeking to resolve 
the governance crisis in Svalbard.  In February 1907, Norway sent diplomatic notes to other European 
countries, offering to arrange a conference to solve what became known as the Svalbard Question.41  
                                                          
34 Rossi, “Unique Problem,” 116-117. And Mathisen, Svalbard, 29. 
35 Mathisen, Svalbard, 39-40. 
36 Mathisen, Svalbard, 41. 
37 Singh, Question, 11. 
38 Singh, Question, 11-18. and Kruse, “Imperialists,” 64-69. 
39 Singh, Question, 25, 48 and Mathisen, Svalbard, 44. 
40 T. Baty, “Current Notes on International Law: Spitzbergen,” Law Magazine and Review 33 (1907): 84-85. And R. 
N. Rudmose Brown, “The commercial development of Spitsbergen,” Scottish Geographical Magazine 28, no. 11 
(1912): 561–571.  For a historical overview of the issue and responses to it, see Urban Wråkberg, “Nature 
Conservationism and the Arctic Commons of Spitsbergen 1900–1920,” Acta Borealia 23, no. 1 (2006): 1-23. 
41 Berg, “Norwegianization,” 166.  And Mathisen, Svalbard, 46-47. 
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According to a U.S. government publication that served as a preparatory document for the 1919 
Svalbard Conference, the Svalbard Question was “the adjustment of the rival claims and interests of 
different (and often conflicting) nationalities in an unpeopled land officially declared terra nullius, but in 
the past a center of whaling, fishing, and hunting, and in the present known to be possessed of very 
great mineral wealth, especially coal, and possibly of some strategic value, particularly with reference to 
Russia and the Scandinavian Peninsula.”42   
While the anarchical situation on Svalbard was widely understood to be unacceptable, it was not 
at all clear what form of governance would be instituted.  Before entering into a discussion of diplomatic 
resolution of the Svalbard negotiations at the successful conference of 1919, it is first necessary to 
explore the legal presuppositions shared by the participants and commentators. 
 
Svalbard and International Law 
 
By the nineteenth century, Svalbard was considered by nearby European nations to be a no 
man’s land.  Cold, remote, and depleted of natural resources, the archipelago avoided the transition 
between the medieval and modern conceptions of sovereignty that is often argued to have occurred 
after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.43  In its apartness from the rest of Europe, Svalbard resembles other 
“legally anomalous spaces” that existed primarily in European overseas empires.44  In these exceptional 
spaces, sovereignty and territory were not nearly as intertwined as in European states.   
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From its discovery to the early twentieth century, Svalbard functioned as a common resource 
pool for citizens from many nations, with two main consequences.45  First, due to the lack of state 
sovereignty, national governments were largely uninterested in and ignorant of Svalbard.  This absence 
of state knowledge and authority empowered non-state actors to exert a substantial influence on the 
Svalbard negotiation process.46  Second, Svalbard’s unusual lack of governance differed greatly from 
typical rules for European states, sparking debate over its legal status and perplexing commentators and 
negotiators.   
One attempt to translate Svalbard’s sui generis status into the language of international law was 
through reference to condominia.  According to American legal scholar Joel H. Samuels, “[a] 
condominium in international law exists when two or more States exercise joint sovereignty over a 
territory.”47  Condominia are unpopular in contemporary international law because of their divergence 
from the typical rules of state sovereignty.48  Nevertheless, the period from 1800 to 1950 witnessed the 
“golden age of the condominium,” when the arrangement was a relatively common solution to 
territorial disputes.49  Indeed, Russia, one of nations most interested in Svalbard, had recently 
participated in a condominium with Japan over the island of Sakhalin.50  Negotiators from Russia and 
Japan had been unable to decide on a border dividing Sakhalin, which lay between their spheres of 
influence, so they agreed that it would exist “undivided between Russia and Japan.”51  This state of 
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affairs would last from 1855 to 1875, when Japan gave up its rights to Sakhalin, placing it under sole 
Russian sovereignty, in exchange for some of the Kuril Islands and other concessions.52  For Russian 
diplomats, it was perhaps only a short step between the “undivided” Sakhalin of 1855 and the 
“undecided” Svalbard of 1871.  Thus, the condominium was certainly a relevant, if somewhat unusual, 
possibility on the minds of those attempting to provide an answer to the Svalbard Question in the 
1910s. 
Despite the apparent resemblance between Svalbard and condominia, one crucial difference 
existed.  A condominium is a territory where sovereignty is exercised jointly by multiple nations, but a 
no man’s land has no sovereignty at all.53  Svalbard was, therefore, more reminiscent of territory outside 
of Europe that had not yet been subjected to colonial conquest.  Although the most recent development 
of principles for the occupation of territory lacking a sovereign had occurred in the 1884-1885 Berlin 
Conference’s division of Africa, such discussion had been ongoing for centuries in legal circles.54  
Historians have traced an evolution in descriptions of such territory from res nullius (nobody’s thing) to 
territorium nullius (nobody’s territory) to terra nullius (nobody’s land).  Res nullius, a notion in Roman 
law, was appropriated by European colonialists to describe land that belonged to no one and could be 
freely annexed.55  Scholars of the early modern period disagreed on whether res nullius could describe 
land that was inhabited, as was the case in the Americas.56  The term remained contested until the 
Berlin Conference from 1884 to 1885.  The Institut de Droit International met in 1888 to formalize the 
legal rules created by the Conference.  At this meeting, the German legal scholar, Ferdinand von Martitz, 
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proposed that the term territorium nullius be used to refer to annexable territory.  Martitz argued that 
the territory of governments who did not belong to the community of the law of nations was territorium 
nullius.  The controversial proposal, which clearly favored expansive colonization, was rejected by most 
of the Institut.  While Martitz was unable to gain the approval of the Institut, he had suggested a 
powerful colonialist argument that raised the bar for exemption from colonization from property 
ownership and basic social organization to sovereignty as defined as membership in the community of 
the law of nations.57 
The term terra nullius appears in a few scattered uses to refer to an abandoned desert island in 
1885 and a Venezuela border region in 1899.58  Terra nullius did not become a widely used term until 
the French legal scholar Camille Piccioni introduced it into the debate over Svalbard’s status in 1909.  It 
was used throughout the Svalbard negotiations and again in the Eastern Greenland case in 1933 and the 
Western Sahara Advisory Opinion in 1975.59  Although terra nullius saw continued use throughout the 
twentieth century, scholars argue that the term did not have the same meaning in 1909 as it did in 1975.  
Marie Jacobsson even refers to governmental use of terra nullius in the Svalbard context as “inexplicable 
from an international law perspective.”60  As will be discussed in later chapters, the meaning of terra 
nullius in the context of the Svalbard Question was ambiguous.  Not surprisingly, negotiators and 
commentators who had less legal expertise frequently made inaccurate or confused statements about 
terra nullius and Svalbard’s status.   
Nevertheless, Svalbard’s apparent difference from the contemporary doctrine of terra nullius is 
real and can only be understood through an analysis of the “extraordinarily varied and rather curious” 
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history of the archipelago and its unique status.61  Observers at the time realized that Svalbard was 
different from colonial territory because it had no indigenous inhabitants, it was frequented by 
Europeans from a number of nations, and it sustained little or no permanent population.  In the words 
of French legal scholar René Waultrin, Svalbard differed from colonial governance in the “tropical 
regions” because it lacked even an “embryo of government.”62  Colonial administrators had no 
experience governing territories with very low population and no local institutions.  Lauren Benton 
argues that, for histories of colonialization, “[o]ur account of European writers’ and scholars’ views on 
res nullius must be separated analytically from an understanding of references to res nullius by imperial 
agents, many operating far from Europe and with partial or indirectly acquired understandings of Roman 
law.”63  In the context of the Svalbard negotiations, the distinction between legal experts and non-
experts is more problematic but still existent.  Knowledge of international law and, consequently, usage 
of the term terra nullius varied widely between different groups of actors in the Svalbard negotiations.  
With adequate background on Svalbard’s history and relevant international law, it is now time to 
construct a taxonomy of actors in the context of the Svalbard Question. 
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Chapter III: The Svalbard Question: Toward a Taxonomy of its Historical Actors 
 
This chapter will detail the different groups of actors in the Svalbard negotiations, name the 
most significant members of each group, and describe the knowledge each group had of international 
law.  It will conclude by presenting a framework for in-depth analysis of the use of terra nullius in 
documents from the period.  The actors engaged in answering the Svalbard Question extend far beyond 
the small number of negotiators present at conferences.  Indeed, with the exception of Norwegian 
Minister Baron Wedel-Jarlsberg and American Secretary of State Robert Lansing, leading historians of 
the Svalbard Question, such as Elen C. Singh and Trygve Mathisen, have devoted most of their attention 
to non-governmental actors.  Scholarship describing the actors involved in the Svalbard Question has 
typically built upon Singh’s work.64  She created the term “Literature Lobby” to refer to the flood of 
publications written during the 1910s to convince various European governments of the benefits of and 
historical justification for claiming Svalbard.65  Works from the “Literature Lobby” covered topics 
including the settlement history of Svalbard, the economic value of the archipelago, and the legal rights 
to it possessed by various nations.  Dutch writers emphasized the presence of the Netherlands in 
Svalbard’s early history.  Lobbyists from Britain and the United States focused on the economic benefits 
of possessing sovereignty over Svalbard and the presence of companies on the archipelago owned by 
their nationals. Norwegian authors pointed to Norway’s substantial historical and contemporary 
presence in Svalbard to argue that the archipelago should belong to Norway.  Some of the most 
important members of the “Literature Lobby” were Charles Rabot, a French naturalist; Adolf Hoel, a 
Norwegian geologist; and William Speirs Bruce, a British scientist.  These writers produced popular and 
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academic articles and even books to argue for their positions.66  As will be discussed below, the 
“Literature Lobby” is less of a unitary group of actors than an overarching term that includes explorers, 
scientists, legal scholars, and corporate lobbyists. 
Explorers and scientists were the most involved and passionate actors in the context of the 
Svalbard Question.  They came from a variety of different nations, including Norway, Sweden, Britain, 
France, and Russia.  Explorers and scientists often wrote for popular magazines, allowing their 
experiences of Svalbard to reach wider audiences.  Indeed, the British explorer and art historian Sir 
William Martin Conway was largely responsible for “incorporating the archipelago in the late 
nineteenth-century European ‘planetary consciousness’” with two books (from 1897 and 1898) detailing 
his adventures in Svalbard.67  Mary Katherine Jones finds Conway to be “an almost unique figure in 
Arctic terms, on the boundary between amateur and professional,” whose accessible and self-
deprecating writing style made Svalbard seem accessible to would-be tourists.68  Conway continued to 
agitate for British governmental action to end the lawlessness of Svalbard by using his influence as a 
Member of Parliament, but met with little success.69 
Other British scientists and explorers interested in Svalbard included William Speirs Bruce and 
Robert Neal Rudmose Brown.  Bruce will be discussed below in the section for corporate lobbyists.  
Rudmose Brown was his friend and assistant, as well as an academic botanist.  Due to Bruce’s poor 
health, Rudmose Brown often gave talks or published papers for him.70  Both men were in favor of a 
British intervention in or annexation of Svalbard to resolve its lack of governance.  In a 1919 paper, 
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Rudmose Brown bolstered the British case for Svalbard by arguing for the strength of British scientific 
expeditions with the claim that “no living man knows more of Spitsbergen than Dr. W. S. Bruce.”  
Furthermore, Norway was “late in the field,” placing it in an inferior position to Britain.71    
The French naturalist and geographer, Charles Rabot, came to a remarkably different conclusion 
about Svalbard’s status.  Rabot was the editor of La Géographie and a frequent collaborator with 
Norwegian scientists.  He was in favor of Norway’s claim to sovereignty over Svalbard and worked with 
Norwegian military officer Gunnar Isachsen and Norwegian geologist Adolf Hoel to draft the Norwegian 
Government’s statement to the Paris Peace Conference.72  In a 1919 article, Rabot argued that Svalbard 
was not terra nullius and already belonged to Norway because it had inherited a Danish claim from the 
seventeenth century.  He thus reasoned that it only remained for the other negotiating parties to 
recognize Norway’s rightful claim.73  While Rabot was certainly influential on the outcome of the 
Svalbard negotiations, he was far from a legal expert.  Indeed, while the explorers and scientists were 
generally respectful toward legal scholars, they were far more knowledgeable about the actual 
conditions of Svalbard and considered much of the legal analysis to be idle speculation.  As Rudmose 
Brown put it, “[t]he problem [of Svalbard] is not an abstraction for the student of political science to 
amuse himself with, but a practical issue fraught with important economic consequences.”74  Although 
explorers and scientists clearly scoffed at the more imaginative and impractical solutions to the Svalbard 
Question, they were still reliant on legal scholars for specialist knowledge about Svalbard’s legal status 
and the meaning of terra nullius. 
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Indeed, legal scholars were influential commentators and participants in the Svalbard 
negotiations and exercised a substantial influence on the use of the term terra nullius.  In the words of 
Oscar Schachter, international lawyers form a “professional community, though dispersed throughout 
the world and engaged in diverse occupations, constitut[ing] a kind of invisible college dedicated to a 
common intellectual enterprise.”75  Since Schachter suggested the existence of an invisible college of 
lawyers in the 1970s, the metaphor has become remarkably popular among legal scholars.  Recent 
scholarship has challenged whether the invisible college can remain unified given the increasing 
fragmentation of international law and the disparities in legal traditions throughout the world.76  During 
the Svalbard negotiations, however, the fragmentation of international law remained many decades 
away.  Additionally, the legal scholars who commented on Svalbard’s status were either European or 
American and generally not from nations directly interested in the outcome of the Svalbard 
negotiations.  As such, it seems reasonable to consider René Waultrin, Camille Piccioni, Robert Lansing, 
and James Edward Geoffrey de Montmorency as relatively disinterested and objective members of the 
invisible college of international lawyers. 
René Waultrin was a French legal scholar who specialized in the polar regions.77  He published a 
number of articles in the Revue Générale de Droit International Public, a top international law journal.  
His most important piece in the context of the Svalbard Question is “La question de la souveraineté des 
terres arctiques,” from 1908, which explores questions of sovereignty in Svalbard, Bear Island, and the 
Northeast Passage.  It is worth noting that Waultrin uses the term res nullius and not terra nullius in his 
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article.  Nevertheless, his usage of res nullius closely matches later uses of terra nullius by other legal 
scholars. 
The first scholar to use the term terra nullius in the context of the Svalbard negotiations was 
Camille Piccioni in his 1909 article “Le Spitzberg. Son organisation international,” also published in the 
Revue Générale de Droit International Public.  Piccioni had long been interested in topics, such as 
condominia and perpetual neutrality, that complicated traditional ideas of state sovereignty.78   Andrew 
Fitzmaurice credits Piccioni with popularizing terra nullius, noting that the term began to emerge in 
general works on international law only a few years later.79 
Building upon earlier work by Waultrin and Piccioni, Robert Lansing published a 1917 article that 
described Svalbard as “A Unique International Problem.”  Although Lansing had written the piece before 
he became U.S. Secretary of State, it was indicative of his official attitude toward the Svalbard Question 
at the 1919 Conference.  An important consideration for Lansing was the recent sale of the Arctic Coal 
Company in 1916.  As the United States no longer had any economic stake in the archipelago, Lansing 
was free to propose abstract philosophical solutions to the Svalbard Question.80  Lansing clearly reveled 
in the task, emphasizing that Svalbard’s status was “entirely novel” and “unusual.”81  The uniqueness of 
the Svalbard Question prompted “consideration of the fundamental principles underlying governmental 
institution.”82  He pondered dividing territorial and political sovereignty to maintain Svalbard’s terra 
nullius status, while also instituting limited governance.  He also appeared somewhat sympathetic to the 
annexation of Svalbard by a “neutral Scandinavian power.”83  The final paragraph of his article perfectly 
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illustrates the abstract philosophical attitude of legal scholars that was so criticized by explorers and 
scientists: 
Whatever may be the final outcome, the subject as originally presented is most absorbing to the 
student of political science and offers him an opportunity to test his theories of sovereignty, 
government, ownership, and similar abstractions, by attempting to apply them to the unusual state 
of affairs which has arisen in Spitzbergen as a result of American enterprise and energy, which, 
overcoming Arctic ice and barrenness, proved to the world the wealth of the islands which no country 
had before that time ever cared to claim as its possessions.84 
Although legal scholars could be remarkably unaware of the real world consequences of the Svalbard 
Question, their speculations did provide a starting point for negotiation.  In Lansing’s case, his interest in 
the Svalbard Question was doubly important because he functioned both as a legal scholar and as a key 
negotiator. 
Diplomats were another important group involved in the Svalbard negotiations.  As mentioned 
above, this thesis will use diplomat to refer broadly to any government official engaged in foreign policy 
activity related to Svalbard.  The most well-known and influential diplomats engaged in resolving the 
Svalbard Question were Baron Wedel-Jarlsberg and Robert Lansing.  Wedel-Jarlsberg was the Norwegian 
Minister for the Svalbard Commission of the Paris Peace Conference.  As was noted above, Wedel-
Jarlsberg’s passionate lobbying was a significant factor in Norway securing sovereignty over Svalbard.  
His most important counterpart was the U.S. Secretary of State, Robert Lansing.  As was discussed 
earlier, Lansing expressed an interest in the Svalbard Question in a 1917 article.  In his role as Secretary 
of State, Lansing favored Norwegian sovereignty as the solution most likely to ease tensions in northern 
Europe.85  In contrast to the more prominent Wedel-Jarlsberg and Lansing, Fred K. Nielsen, the Assistant 
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Solicitor for the State Department and American representative at the conference, focused more on the 
details of the resolution of the Svalbard Question.86  In 1920, he published an article describing the 
results of the Svalbard Commission and directed somewhat critical remarks at the “somewhat fantastic 
plans” that had been proposed by legal scholars but avoided by the grant of sovereignty to Norway.87  
While diplomats were essential in reaching the final Svalbard Treaty, they were largely reliant on legal 
scholars for descriptions of terra nullius and Svalbard’s status.  In terms of engagement with Svalbard 
itself, diplomats were little better than legal scholars.  An anecdote told by the historian, Trygve 
Mathisen, illustrates the point nicely: 
Longyear invited the conference delegates on a trip to Svalbard, so that they could study 
conditions at first hand.  Fortunately for Longyear the invitation was declined.  The 20 odd 
diplomats would hardly have been particularly comfortable on board the old whaler at the 
disposal of the Arctic Coal Company.88 
In contrast to legal scholars and diplomats, coal mining corporations and their agents demonstrated the 
benefits of engagement both with those living in Svalbard and government officials further south in 
Europe and the United States.  As mentioned above, the Scottish Spitsbergen Syndicate and the Arctic 
Coal Company were the two most influential corporations in Svalbard in the 1910s.  William Speirs 
Bruce, the founder of the Scottish Spitsbergen Syndicate, relied on his reputation as a polar explorer and 
his connections with the Royal Geographical Society to lobby the British government to annex Svalbard.  
In 1917, Douglas W. Freshfield, the President of the Royal Geographical Society, wrote to the British 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the request of the Council of Royal Geographical Society 
emphasizing “the importance of taking immediate steps to safeguard British interests, political, 
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strategic, and commercial, in Spitsbergen [Svalbard], and to urge that the matter be adjusted with our 
Allies before the termination of the war.”89  This was a remarkable step by the Royal Geographical 
Society, which typically avoided taking specific political positions.  Unfortunately for Bruce, the British 
government never took any action toward the annexation of Svalbard, possibly due to its greater 
interest in the German mandates.90 
The Arctic Coal Company, owned by Americans Frederick Ayer and John Longyear, was much 
more successful in its lobbying mission than the Scottish Spitsbergen Syndicate.  Longyear was a mining 
and lumber magnate from Marquette, Michigan.91  Ayer, Longyear’s friend and business associate, was a 
wealthy investor from the Boston area.92  Longyear had originally become interested in coal mining in 
Svalbard after a visit as a tourist in 1903.93  Given their wealth and political connections, Longyear and 
Ayer soon ranked among the most important American actors interested in the Svalbard Question.  
 Corporate lobbyists, even if they were not actual explorers like Bruce, tended to travel relatively 
often to Svalbard, unlike diplomats and legal scholars.  Ayer and Longyear pressured the U.S. State 
Department to ensure that property rights would be protected in Svalbard.  Schemes such as American 
annexation or corporate ownership of Svalbard gained some support, but were eventually turned down 
by Congress due to State Department concerns and Norwegian protests.94  Perhaps the Arctic Coal 
Company’s most important impact on Svalbard’s future was its success in lobbying the U.S. State 
Department to resist international agreements that would introduce taxation on Svalbard.  American 
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and German reluctance to accept diminished influence in Svalbard was a significant factor in the failure 
of the conferences of 1910, 1912, and 1914.95 
Corporate lobbyists, while quite influential in shaping the path of the Svalbard negotiations, fit 
only loosely in the category of the “Literature Lobby.”  With the exception of William Speirs Bruce, 
corporate lobbyists often limited their communication to private conversations with government 
officials, in contrast to the more popular campaigns of explorers and scientists discussed above.  
Consequently, their role in the evolution of the term terra nullius is minimal. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Svalbard by the 1910s was in a unique but increasingly unstable situation.  The system of state 
sovereignty had failed to take root in Svalbard, with an international commons enduring instead.  With 
ever-increasing tensions due to the introduction of coal mining on the archipelago, the newly 
independent Norwegian government attempted to resolve the Svalbard Question over the course of 
four conferences.  Due to previous governmental ignorance of and apathy toward Svalbard, non-state 
actors, including explorers, scientists, legal scholars, and corporate lobbyists, were able to influence the 
negotiations to a remarkable extent.  Each of these groups possessed different knowledge that was 
relevant to resolving the Svalbard Question.  Explorers and scientists knew the environmental and 
economic conditions of Svalbard first hand and often expressed frustration at the abstract 
philosophizing practiced by other groups.  Diplomats had set the terms of the debate in 1871-1872 and 
were aware of the complex geopolitical considerations that restricted their ability to reach a solution to 
the Svalbard Question.  They relied on legal scholars for theory about Svalbard’s current and future 
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status and on explorers and scientists for up-to-date data about economic activities on Svalbard.  
Corporate lobbyists straddled the world between explorers and diplomats, as many visited the 
archipelago repeatedly while also remaining in close contact with government officials.  Legal scholars 
might seem to be the sole obvious choice for analysis of the use of terra nullius, but, as has been argued 
above, it is essential to view each group involved as part of the larger system of the Svalbard 
negotiations.  While legal scholars did possess by far the most coherent and detailed views about terra 
nullius and Svalbard’s status, they were reliant on explorers and scientists for information about 
Svalbard’s current and historical human presence.  Furthermore, to effect change in Svalbard’s status, 
legal scholars needed to communicate successfully with diplomats and government officials directly 
involved in the negotiation process.  The next chapter will compare this complex taxonomy of actors 
with more reductive attempts in the secondary literature to characterize the period.  This thesis will 
argue that only by understanding the interplay between different actors in the context of the Svalbard 
Question can the issue of the anomalous usage of terra nullius be fully understood. 
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Chapter IV: Historiographical Interpretations of Terra Nullius Usage in the Context of the 
Svalbard Question 
 
Studying the use of terra nullius in the context of the Svalbard Question is a difficult task due to 
the interdisciplinary nature of the issue.  The secondary literature on the topic is split quite starkly into 
historical and legal camps.  These two groups are rarely cite or even acknowledge the existence of each 
other, making a comprehensive summary of scholarly work on terra nullius and Svalbard a demanding 
task.  This chapter will present a survey of historiographical interpretations of terra nullius usage in the 
context of the Svalbard Question from 1954 to the present day.  I make no claims to having made a 
completely exhaustive search, but this chapter will present a state of the field that is far more 
comprehensive than any preexisting work.96  The secondary sources fall into three main categories in 
their treatment of the anomalous usage of terra nullius.  One group acknowledges the contradiction 
between terra nullius and regulation and the prevention of annexation, but does not attempt to resolve 
it.  A second group explains the contradiction as a mistaken use of an international law concept with 
enduring meaning.  The third group identifies the anomalous usage of terra nullius as knowing political 
manipulation of one sort or another.  The most important characteristic of all three groups is a general 
lack of deep analysis of the historical context of and actors involved in the resolution of the Svalbard 
Question. 
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The first secondary source to address the question of the use of terra nullius in the Svalbard 
context is Trygve Mathisen’s 1954 book, Svalbard in International Politics 1871-1925.  The book remains 
the best overview of Svalbard’s history during the relevant time period.  Mathisen devotes most of his 
attention to diplomatic negotiations and much less to legal terminology.  Toward the end of the book, 
Mathisen reflects on the Svalbard Treaty and states that is was “one of the most upright territorial 
decisions in diplomatic history” because of its balance between Norwegian sovereignty and equal access 
for other nations.97  He claims that the outcome of the Svalbard Treaty is easier to understand if 
Svalbard during the negotiations is seen not as terra nullius, but as “terra omnium.”98  It seems that 
Mathisen is arguing that actors in the Svalbard context were not necessarily wrong to refer to Svalbard 
as terra nullius, but the situation nevertheless seemed to resemble res communis (the international law 
equivalent to “terra omnium”) more closely.  He does not make any claims about what Svalbard actors 
thought that terra nullius meant.   
The next scholar to touch on the topic was the Dutch legal scholar J. H. W. Verzijl in the early 
1970s.  In the third volume (“State Territory”) of his International Law in Historical Perspective series, he 
describes Svalbard as a “very special type of terra nullius” and an “artificial territorium nullius.”99  Verzijl 
appears to use the terms terra nullius and territorium nullius interchangeably.  His use of the word 
“artificial” coincides nicely with French legal scholar, René Waultrin’s characterization of a “political” res 
nullius status.100  Verzijl does not address whether historical actors during the Svalbard negotiations 
would have considered the terra nullius regime to be “artificial,” or if it only appears so years later after 
changes in meaning.  If Verzijl elaborated more on the nature of the artificiality of terra nullius in the 
Svalbard context, then it might be possible to place him in the intentional political manipulation school 
                                                          
97 Mathisen, Svalbard, 176. 
98 Mathisen, Svalbard, 176. 
99 J.H.W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective Volume IV (A.W. Sijthoff-Leyden, 1971): 3, 271. 
100 « Res nullius au point de vue politique » Waultrin, “Question,” 122. 
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of thought.  The limited discussion he gives of the topic instead passes this task on to later scholars, such 
as Geir Ulfstein and Christopher R. Rossi.  
Verzijl’s concept of an “artificial” terra nullius proved influential in later analysis by legal 
scholars.  Most notably, it was cited in Geir Ulfstein’s 1995 work, The Svalbard Treaty; From Terra Nullius 
to Norwegian Sovereignty.  Ulfstein begins by distinguishing between terra nullius and res communis.  
The two terms are similar in that both describe territory that is not under the sovereignty of any one 
state.  However, they can be distinguished because terra nullius is open to being placed under the 
sovereignty of the first nation that claims it, while res communis can never be acquired by a single state.  
Ulfstein admits that considering Svalbard to be terra nullius while forbidding its annexation seems to be 
a “contradiction” and he appeals to Verzijl’s description of the regime as “artificial.”101  However, for the 
rest of his book, which explores Svalbard’s contemporary legal status, he assumes that the archipelago 
was accurately described as terra nullius and thus ignores the historical usage question.102  Ulfstein’s 
work proved to be quite influential and is probably the most cited authority on the use of terra nullius in 
the Svalbard Question, despite mostly evading the issue in a space of three pages.  In his 2012 article, 
“Naturressursene og verdenspolitikken på Svalbard 1596-2011,” [“Natural resources and world politics 
in Svalbard 1596-2011”], for example, Roald Berg cites Ulfstein and argues that, “[t]he Spitsbergen 
Islands were regarded as terra nullius or no-man's land without state ownership and not subject to any 
authority. This was the international legal status. The practical reality was that the islands became terra 
communis: common land for citizens of all countries.”103   Similarly, a plaque at the Svalbard Museum in 
Longyearbyen claims that “Svalbard was a kind of international common land.”104  These approaches are 
                                                          
101 Ulfstein, Treaty, 37, 39-40. 
102 Ulfstein, Treaty, 37. 
103 Roald Berg, “Naturressursene og verdenspolitikken på Svalbard 1596-2011,” Nordlit 29 (2012): 184. 
104 Observations during a personal visit to Svalbard, summer 2019. 
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similar in that they describe pre-treaty Svalbard as an open-access commons and acknowledge that it 
was referred to historically as terra nullius, but do not attempt to resolve the resulting contradiction. 
Marie Jacobsson’s 2004 book chapter, “Acquisition of territory at the time of Otto Nordenskjöld: 
a Swedish perspective,” demonstrates a different approach to the apparent paradox of a governed, 
open-access terra nullius that is immune from annexation.  She argues that the anomalous use of terra 
nullius by the Norwegian and Swedish governments during the Svalbard negotiations is “inexplicable 
from an international law perspective.”105  Jacobsson attempts to locate the reason for this mistaken 
usage in the small number of international lawyers in those countries, suggesting that only a near total 
lack of expertise in the field could be responsible for such a blatant error.106  She appears not to have 
considered the possibility of the meaning of terra nullius changing over time.  Jacobsson also makes no 
attempt to explain why countries with more robust international law infrastructure also used the same 
meaning of terra nullius as the Norwegian and Swedish governments.  For this reason, her account is of 
limited utility for understanding the usage of terra nullius in the Svalbard context.   
A recent work addressing the role of terra nullius during the Svalbard negotiations is M. 
Zadorin’s 2018 article, “The doctrine of ‘common territory’ versus ‘terra nullius’: political geography in 
the political and legal context of Spitsbergen’s status in the late 19th century – first half of the 20th 
century.”  Zadorin views the description of Svalbard as terra nullius as a dishonest means by which the 
Norwegian government consolidated control over a previously international common resource area.  He 
cites significant Russian activity in Svalbard before 1871 and his approach can best be understood in the 
broader context of Soviet and later Russian discontent with the Svalbard Treaty.107   Zadorin’s argument 
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is best summarized by his claim that “the marking of Svalbard as “terra nullius” until the signing of the 
Treaty of 1920 existing to this day in a large layer of historical, political and legal literature, is the starting 
point for the violation of the international common use regime in relation to the Spitsbergen 
archipelago.”108  Zadorin’s article can therefore be understood as a response to Ulfstein and others who 
illustrate the apparent discrepancy between Svalbard’s de facto commons status and de jure terra 
nullius designation, but do not attempt to reconcile the two.  He argues that the difference is real and 
explainable by the Norwegian government’s manipulation.109  This argument does not seem to be well 
supported by primary sources, not least for the reason that the Russian government enthusiastically 
endorsed the status quo principle of terra nullius throughout the 1910s. 
A related view is expounded in the 2016 law article by Christopher R. Rossi entitled, “‘A Unique 
International Problem’: The Svalbard Treaty, Equal Enjoyment, and Terra Nullius: Lessons of Territorial 
Temptation from History.”  Rossi focuses specifically on how the “territorial temptation,” a phenomenon 
that occurs when states manipulate established legal order, especially of global commons, to acquire 
resources or territory, has manifested itself in the context of Svalbard.110  Rossi opens the paper with a 
contemporary example from 2015 of Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s deputy prime minister at the time, who 
made an unauthorized stop in Svalbard.  The subsequent back-and-forth between the Norwegian and 
Russian government showed that ambiguity remains over Svalbard’s status nearly a century after the 
signing of the Svalbard Treaty in 1920.111   
Rossi traces Svalbard’s present anomalous status to its legal position in the years leading up to 
the Svalbard Treaty.   He argues that a number of states relied on the ambiguous meaning of terra 
                                                          
108 Zadorin, “Doctrine,” 6. 
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Spitsbergen: legal regime of adjacent marine areas (Eleven International Publishing, 2007). 
110 Rossi, “Unique Problem,” 97.  See also Bernard Oxman, “The Territorial Temptation: A Siren Song at Sea,” The 
American Journal of International Law 100, no. 4 (2006): 830. 
111 Rossi, “Unique Problem,” 94-97. 
36 
 
nullius to secure resources or sovereignty in the archipelago.  Citing Ulfstein, Rossi distinguishes 
between terra nullius and res communis.  Terra nullius means a no man’s land that is open to occupation 
and annexation by the first claimant.  Res communis means a thing belonging to everyone that cannot 
be appropriated by any person or group.112  When a state was unable to successfully assert sovereignty, 
Rossi claims, it would affirm the terra nullius status of Svalbard as an area open to access and resource 
extraction by all nations, but incapable of annexation (actually res communis).113  This model of 
diplomatic balancing can account for the international similarities in anomalous usage of terra nullius in 
a way that Zadorin cannot.  While Rossi’s account of planned ambiguity regarding the meaning of terra 
nullius is very intriguing, his article lacks the required primary source support.  
Perhaps the most historically rigorous work on terra nullius has been undertaken by Andrew 
Fitzmaurice, an Australian historian.  He touched upon the role of terra nullius in Svalbard briefly in his 
2007 article, “The Genealogy of Terra Nullius.”   He expanded this analysis in his 2014 book, Sovereignty, 
Property and Empire, 1500–2000.  In a chapter called “Terra Nullius and the Polar Regions,” Fitzmaurice 
argues that there was significant evidence for “the transformation of the idea of terra nullius, in the 
early polar debates, from being a description of land that was common, and so could not be 
appropriated, to land that was open to the first taker.”114  Thus, Fitzmaurice argues that terra nullius in 
the Svalbard context simply meant what res communis does today.  I have significant doubts about the 
starkness of this transition in meaning, as well as about his claim that it occurred largely because of 
technological innovations and expansionist ideas in Norway in the 1920s and 1930s.115  Nevertheless, 
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Fitzmaurice’s work contains a far greater number of primary sources from the period of the Svalbard 
Question and counts as a substantial step forward in understanding the use of terra nullius. 
This survey of secondary works on Svalbard and terra nullius has identified three primary 
strategies.  The first approach, used by Geir Ulfstein and a number of others, is to acknowledge the 
potential incongruence between the regulated open-access nature of Svalbard and its terra nullius 
description, but make no attempt to reconcile it.  The second, as exemplified by Marie Jacobsson, is to 
dismiss any anomalous use of terra nullius as erroneous and deriving from ignorance of actual 
international law.  The third strategy is to acknowledge the incompatibility of terra nullius and 
international regulation and argue that the misuse was deliberate and strategic.  Zadorin and Rossi both 
opt for this route.  This thesis builds upon the approaches mentioned above by providing a more 
nuanced and pluralistic account of the actors involved in the Svalbard Question.  In the next chapter, I 
will turn to the primary documents to show that terra nullius in the Svalbard context was used 
differently depending on the actor.  Ultimately, I will conclude that although the meaning of terra nullius 
was somewhat in flux, certain perceptive thinkers understood and criticized its anomalous usage.  
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Chapter V: The Use of Terra Nullius in the Context of the Svalbard Question 
 
Before delving more deeply into the diverse meanings of terra nullius as the term was used in 
the context of the Svalbard Question, it will be useful to recall the definition of terra nullius in 
contemporary international law.  As discussed above, the 1975 Western Sahara Advisory Opinion 
provides the authoritative definition in international law of terra nullius as territory belonging to no 
nation that is open to acquisition and the imposition of sovereignty.  This thesis distinguished between 
acquisitive nullification, the creation of legal entities that have no sovereign and are capable of 
placement under such sovereignty by the first claimant state, and distributive nullification, the 
establishment of legal entities that are owned by no sovereign and excluded from the possibility of such 
a status.  While the contemporary use of terra nullius in international law corresponds with acquisitive 
nullification, scholars of the Svalbard Question have argued that the usage of terra nullius from 1907 to 
1919 was more similar to distributive nullification and hence anomalous from the contemporary 
perspective.  This thesis will now explore, in roughly chronological order, the usage of terra nullius in key 
documents of the Svalbard Question period.  I will focus primarily on the published writings of the 
“Literature Lobby,” as well as occasional unpublished pamphlets and letters. 
The first published work to deal substantially with Svalbard’s status under international law was 
René Waultrin’s “La question de la souveraineté des terres arctiques” [“The Question of the Sovereignty 
of the Arctic Lands”], published in 1908 in the Revue générale de droit international public, a French 
international law journal.  In his article, Waultrin took up three main issues in Arctic sovereignty: “La 
question du Spitsberg,” “La question de l’Ile d’Ours,” and “La question du passage du Nord-Est” [“The 
Question of Spitsbergen (Svalbard)”, “The Question of Bear Island,” and “The Question of the North-East 
Passage”].116  This thesis will focus only on his discussion of Svalbard.  Waultrin’s article does not use the 
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term, terra nullius, but it does use a related one, res nullius.  The exact relation between the terms is 
controversial and likely differs on the context of usage.  In Waultrin’s case, he uses res nullius in a 
basically identical way to how terra nullius was used by other authors only a few years later.  As such, his 
article is essential to understanding the development of terra nullius in the context of the Svalbard 
Question. 
Waultrin wrote that the topic of Arctic sovereignty, and Svalbard more specifically, posed 
difficult political, economic, and moral questions.  The political questions involved the legal status of 
land and sea that was strategically important to specific nations, such as Canada or Russia.  The 
economic questions expressed the importance of valuable mineral deposits.  The moral questions posed 
the issue of protecting the lives and property of those of travelled or lived in the region.  This last 
question was starkly important given the recent labor strike that had taken place in Svalbard.117  The 
principles of international law posed by these issues were: “What are the legal foundations for taking 
possession of these territories? To what conditions should a sustainable establishment be subject? What 
regime should be imposed?118   
Waultrin then goes on to detail the history of Svalbard.  He writes that from 1871 to 1872, the 
foreign ministries of Russia and Sweden exchanged diplomatic notes regarding Svalbard’s status.  He 
admits that he does not have access to the documents and that “[w]e only know that the two 
governments considered Spitsbergen (Svalbard) to be res nullius.”119  Thus far, Waultrin has merely 
transformed the informal agreement of the 1871-1872 diplomatic exchange into legal terminology.  
However, he then expresses a key worry that shows questions about the proper definition of Svalbard’s 
status existed from the very beginning of scholarly discussion.  Waultrin writes, “[w]ithout wishing to 
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discuss the terms of a poorly known agreement…it should be noted that there is something strange and 
contradictory in proclaiming a land without a master and giving it laws, or at least subjecting it to 
regulations.”120 
The diplomatic notes from 1871-1872, which were later published in 1912, did not use the terms 
res nullius or terra nullius.  Instead, they referred to Svalbard as “an undecided domain accessible to all 
states whose nationals seek to exploit its natural resources.”121  This is an apt description of Svalbard at 
the time of Waultrin’s writing and also conforms with his understanding of the content of the notes.  
Furthermore, a diplomatic note sent by Norway in February 1907 to a number of nations with interests 
in Svalbard states that “My Government [Norway] expressly wishes to emphasize that it is not the goal 
of this present communication to raise the question of a modification in the state of the islands as 
countries which do not belong to any State, and which are to the same degree open to subjects from all 
States.”122  Waultrin did not have access to this note either, but he writes that “we know enough about 
it to know that it does not envisage the possibility of a change in the situation of the territories in 
question as res nullius, equally open to all.” 123 
Thus, while Waultrin did not know the precise language of the diplomatic negotiations, it is 
probably safe to assume that he is right to say that if asked, negotiators would describe Svalbard as res 
nullius, by which they would mean territory lacking sovereignty and open to resource extraction by all 
nations.  Waultrin also clearly expresses an objection to this understanding of the definition of res 
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nullius because he does not think that territory said to be lacking sovereignty can at the same time be 
regulated by governments.   
Waultrin returns to this problem later in the article, where he writes, “[r]es nullius from a 
political point of view, Spitsbergen would not, however, be susceptible to annexation: this remains 
prohibited to prevent the action of a third power coming to replace the international organization. The 
archipelago will constitute a free land, analogous to what the high seas are, and subject like it to 
regulations.”124  The characterization of a “political” res nullius suggests that Svalbard is quite unlike a 
typical res nullius.  Like the high seas, Svalbard is under international regulation and cannot be claimed 
by any one nation.  Somewhat tellingly, the high seas are described in contemporary international law as 
res communis (common areas), a legal status quite distinct from terra nullius.125  Thus, Svalbard more 
resembles the unique case of international regulation of the high seas than it does ungoverned land.  
“Political” res nullius is a useful approximation of a concept that would later become known as res 
communis.  For Waultrin, however, simply referring to Svalbard as res nullius was misleading. 
Discussion of Svalbard’s international status would become increasingly common in the next few 
years.  In 1908, French historian and journalist René Puaux wrote a short article for L’Opinion entitled 
“La Conference Internationale du Spitzberg” [“The International Conference of Spitsbergen”].126  He 
briefly details Svalbard’s history and recent Norwegian attempts to hold a conference to decide its legal 
status.  Puaux suggests that the varied foreign interests would make consensus on a new legal status for 
Svalbard difficult, “leaving Spitsbergen res nullius but allowing, at fishing season, an international police 
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force, represented in this case by a coast guard of one or another power invested with full powers…”127  
In this article, Puaux seems to confirm Waultrin’s perception of the diplomatic usage of res nullius in a 
political sense. 
In 1909, two more publications discussing Svalbard’s international status appeared in print.  One 
was “La question du Spitzberg. Les intérêts de la science devant la conférence internationale” [“The 
Spitsbergen Question. Scientific interests before the International Conference”], written by the French 
essayist Léonie Bernardini.128  She describes Svalbard as “terra nullius, open and equally accessible to all 
the nations.”129  In 1871, she says, Russian opposition to Swedish-Norwegian annexation of the 
archipelago caused Svalbard to remain terra nullius.   Further international negotiations would not 
change this basic fact, but would likely result in some sort of legal code for the archipelago.130  
Bernardini does not appear to suggest any incoherence in imagining Svalbard regulated and also 
maintaining its terra nullius status. 
A second publication on the Svalbard Question to appear in 1909 was “Le Spitzberg. Son 
organisation internationale.” [“Spitsbergen. Its international organization.”], by the French legal scholar 
Camille Piccioni in the Revue générale de droit international public.131  This article appeared in the same 
international law journal as did Waultrin’s article and it cited his work.  Piccioni, like Bernardini, writes 
that the 1872 agreement between Russian and Sweden-Norway caused Svalbard to retain its terra 
nullius status.132  Recent attempts at negotiations between the Norwegians, British, and Russians would 
likely “leave Spitsbergen in the situation of terra nullius, with the more or less vague idea of multi-
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stakeholder control, of a kind of plural condominium, which, by this very fact that the number of 
participants in the condominium is larger, is intended, as we hope to demonstrate, to differ on certain 
points from the condominium for two, hitherto known form of co-sovereignty.”133  Piccioni thus suggests 
that proposals to implement international regulations in Svalbard while leaving it terra nullius resembled 
a condominium approach of unprecedented size.   
As was described in the previous chapter, a “condominium in international law exists when two 
or more States exercise joint sovereignty over a territory.”134  This thesis also argued that a significant 
distinction between Svalbard and condominia was that a condominium is a territory where sovereignty 
is exercised jointly by multiple nations, but a terra nullius territory permits no sovereignty at all.135  Thus, 
while Piccioni goes on to give a detailed history of condominia in international law, he reaches a similar 
conclusion to Waultrin that the terminology used by the diplomats is misleading.  Piccioni considers a 
common suggestion for the solution of the Svalbard Question: “Why should Spitsbergen not remain a 
terra nullius, but a terra nullius where the few local industries and the rights and duties of those who 
engage in them are summarily regulated?” and responds, “[t]his solution, launched in the press, is 
perhaps that which the Conference will arrive at; but it is far from excluding all difficulty.”136 
Piccioni continues “[a]nd first, even if the Conference solemnly recognizes Spitsbergen as terra 
nullius, the mere fact that this archipelago will receive an embryo of organization, — a status, however 
rudimentary it may be, — that will suffice to remove it from the category of territories lacking 
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sovereignty.”137  He argues that the negotiating countries that are attempting to regulate Svalbard while 
claiming that it remains terra nullius are using confused terminology and have no power to exert their 
decision on third party states.  Piccioni writes “[b]y the mere fact that ten states declare it nullius, the 
situation of Spitsbergen has already changed: it is no longer susceptible to appropriation, and it 
therefore loses one of the main characteristics of vacant territory.”138  He continues “[h]owever, if the 
Conference prefers the term “nobody’s territory” to “undivided territory” or “common sphere of 
influence,” this makes no difference.  One must conclude from the proclamation of the archipelago as 
terra nullius that no one intends to reserve any exclusive right there even from an economic point of 
view, and that Spitsbergen, even and above all after ten states have organized security there, will 
remain open to all nations.”139  Piccioni ultimately views the multilateral attempt to regulate a terra 
nullius territory as vaguely incoherent and likely doomed to irrelevance.  
Usage of terra nullius over the next few years was relatively sparse.  In 1912, the Norwegian 
cartographer and military officer and later Norwegian negotiatior, Gunnar Isachsen, wrote a brief article 
about the discovery of Svalbard in a book detailing Prince Albert of Monaco’s expeditions to 
archipelago.140  Isachsen wrote that after the 1871-1872 diplomatic exchange, Svalbard remained terra 
nullius.  He cited Waultrin’s article, showing that the work of legal scholars was reasonably well known 
to scientists, explorers, and other laypersons interested in the archipelago, although the nuances were 
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unlikely to be fully transmitted.141  Another work was published in the same year by Arnold Ræstad, a 
Norwegian lawyer and diplomat, which provided a remarkably detailed survey of Svalbard’s diplomatic 
history.142  The article focused primarily on the period from Svalbard’s discovery in 1596 to its gradual 
decrease in international importance by the late eighteenth century.  Ræstad argued that Svalbard in 
the eighteenth century was not considered as terra nullius, but rather as an undecided status generated 
by widespread apathy.  He emphasized that the Danish and Norwegian kings had never given up their 
claims to sovereignty from centuries earlier.  This appeal to historical claims of the archipelago would 
become a key component of arguments by Norwegian negotiators for Svalbard to be placed under 
Norway’s sovereignty.143 
After the failure of the 1910, 1912, and 1914 conferences to accomplish any progress toward 
solving the Svalbard Question, interest in the topic appears to have waned until near the end of the First 
World War.  One major exception was an article published by the American Secretary of State, Robert 
Lansing, in 1917, but written before he took office.  In this work, Lansing remarks on the “extraordinary 
political state of islands” that were populated and hosting industry, but remained unannexed by any 
nation.  He suggests that continued declarations of Svalbard’s terra nullius status had dissuaded 
annexation.144  According to Lansing, the issue posed by Svalbard was “entirely novel” and thus a search 
of the historical record would be of little use.  How could a territory with no sovereignty be governed?   
Lansing argued that legal scholars would have to turn to political philosophy and “an analysis of the 
abstract idea of sovereignty.”145  Doing so, he drew a distinction between territorial sovereignty 
(governance of an area) and political sovereignty (governance of a group of people).  He claims that the 
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ability to pull these two types of sovereignty apart demonstrates the possibility of governance of 
Svalbard that maintained its terra nullius status.146  Although quite satisfied with his solution, Lansing 
suggests that increased tensions in Europe due to the First World War might make international 
governance impossible.  In this case, a Scandinavian nation would likely be given sovereignty over 
Svalbard.  Nevertheless, Lansing cautioned that assigning sovereignty to one nation would hardly be 
easy given the multitude of competing claims.147 
Lansing can be considered as a legal thinker in the same category as Waultrin and Piccioni.  
However, while they argue that government regulation and terra nullius are simply incompatible, 
Lansing digs deeper into the philosophical underpinnings of international law to argue that a 
reconciliation might be possible.  His article provides evidence for a legitimate theoretical dispute about 
the meanings of terra nullius and sovereignty.  Ultimately, Lansing’s musings were never acted upon and 
most diplomats, scientists, and explorers continued to uncritically combine terra nullius with governance 
in Svalbard.  
As the First World War drew to a close and the possibility of a resolution of the Svalbard 
Question arose, a number of works on the subject were published.  The majority were written by non-
legal experts and with a clear nationalistic aim in mind.  Some, like those written by Charles Rabot 
claimed that Svalbard “is not a terra nullius” because claims by the Danish and Norwegian kings were 
still active.148  Others, perhaps envisioning a post-war territorial scramble, argued that “Spitsbergen is a 
terra nullius; property acquired by occupation is at the mercy of the strongest new-comer; might is right; 
there is no security against or redress for wrong-doing.”149  Still others argued that “Spitzbergen is a 
                                                          
146 Lansing, “Problem,” 765-767. 
147 Lansing, “Problem,” 770-771. 
148 Rabot, “Norwegians,” 225-226. 
149 Anonymous, “British interests,” 247. 
47 
 
Terra Nullius, and no Power is to-day in a position to claim this vast area.”150  These works might 
occasionally cite the legal scholars mentioned above, but seldom showed understanding or interest in 
the finer points of international law.   
Ultimately, however, the various schemes of resolving the Svalbard Question were ignored in 
favor of common sense Norwegian sovereignty.  Indeed, while reflecting on the outcome of the 
Conference, the American representative, Fred K. Nielsen, wrote that “[p]olitical considerations 
affecting this relatively unimportant territory which had previously necessitated the consideration of 
somewhat fantastic plans did not stand in the way of a practical solution of the question which has 
frequently in the past been the cause of international complications.”151 
 To sum up, Svalbard was in the unusual position of possessing growing population and industry, 
yet lacking sovereignty.  The previous informal agreement between Sweden-Norway and Russia from 
1872 was interpreted by legal scholars as maintaining a terra nullius status of the archipelago.  Issues 
with Svalbard’s lawless status required intervention and a number of diplomats and other interested 
parties suggested that Svalbard be given a limited level of international governance while remaining 
terra nullius.  The legal scholars Waultrin and Piccioni pointed out the incompatibility of Svalbard’s 
unannexability and proposed international governance with its terra nullius status, while Lansing 
attempted to reconcile them.     
Discussion of the issue outside of international law journals was largely unaware of the anomaly 
and thus referred uncritically to Svalbard as both terra nullius and potentially subject to governance.  
Perhaps the best example of this general lack of precision toward legal terminology on the part of 
diplomats occurs in a letter written in January 1919 by Count Ehrensvard to the Swedish Foreign 
Minister Hellner: “the Spitzberg should remain terra nullius.  This will be achieved through this solution 
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[a Norwegian mandate]; it may be a res omnium, mais les extrêmes se touchent and in essence it 
amounts to the same.”152  For diplomats, as for scientists, explorers, and lobbyists, the priority was 
solving the concrete political issue and not engaging in abstract legal theorizing.  As such, they drew 
upon legal scholars’ summarization of the 1872 status quo as terra nullius while ignoring the definitional 
and philosophical problems that this raised. 
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Chapter VI: Conclusion 
 
In a 2005 article entitled, “The Edges of Empire and the Limits of Sovereignty: American Guano 
Islands,” Christina Duffy Burnett provides a counterpoint to the focus on imperialism as “the acquisition 
of territory, the projection of power, the extension of sovereignty.”153  Instead, “[t]he practice of 
imperialism in the United States, and elsewhere, has been tentative and ambiguous as well as aggressive 
and assertive; it has relied on the creation of legal categories that do their work by withholding, 
retracting, and assiduously delimiting national power, as well as by increasing and extending it.”154  This 
is a valuable viewpoint and can help clarify a number of developments that occurred in the diplomatic 
history of Svalbard.  The 1872 agreement between Russia and Sweden-Norway maintained Svalbard as 
“an undecided domain accessible to all states whose nationals seek to exploit its natural resources” that 
was also incapable of annexation.155  Neither Russia nor Sweden-Norway could annex Svalbard without 
incurring significant penalties to their international reputation.  By declaring Svalbard an unannexable 
commons, they excluded potential third parties and positioned themselves as the primary guarantors of 
its status.  A similar strategy appears to have been undertaken throughout the 1910s as Svalbard’s terra 
nullius was treated as sacrosanct in negotiations.  No nation was in the position to unilaterally claim 
Svalbard, but each wanted remain eligible for future claims.  Maintaining Svalbard’s terra nullius status 
allowed this to occur. 
Did the diplomats’ strategically restrictive policy toward Svalbard’s sovereignty influence the 
usage of terra nullius?  I believe it did, but not intentionally.  When the informal diplomatic agreement 
of 1872 was translated into concrete legal terminology, it was inevitable that confusion would result.  
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The agreement was a strategic solution to appear to reject sovereignty over Svalbard, but by doing so 
claim the position to determine its status for the future.  Instead of being identified as terra nullius by 
traditional legal principles, Svalbard was simply declared to be so by Russia and Sweden-Norway.  The 
paradox of this unusual method of nullification came to light once Svalbard’s ungoverned status became 
practically infeasible.  Not only was Svalbard a terra nullius that could not be annexed, but soon it could 
become both unannexable and internationally governed.  Legal scholars including Waultrin, Piccioni, and 
Lansing recognized this incompatibility.  While Waultrin and Piccioni rejected the terra nullius 
appellation as incorrect or at least misleading, Lansing attempted to provide a new theoretical definition 
of sovereignty to justify it.  Ultimately, however, this complex legal debate was unimportant for the 
diplomats, scientists, and explorers who comprised the majority of the Svalbard “Literature Lobby.”  The 
anomalous use of terra nullius by diplomats and others is thus a “case of pragmatic men seeing existing 
legal terminology as too strictly binding for a deeply idiosyncratic political question.”156  To a certain 
extent, the diplomats were right to ignore abstract legal issues, as various proposals of international 
governance were dismissed and the practical solution of Norwegian sovereignty was chosen.  
Nevertheless, the unique nature of the 1920 Svalbard Treaty testifies to the importance of Svalbard’s 
unusual legal status and the fascinating legal debate that came with it.     
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